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Abstract 
In the face of tremendous adversity, indigenous
 peoples have long sought to flourish as distinc
t 
commumtie on their ancestral lands, and th
ey have endeavoured to roll back inequities
 
lingering as the result of historical patterns of co
lonisation. 
The author submits that historically indigenou
s peoples, not qualifying as States, could no
t 
' ........... - - ----
participate in the shaping of international law. O
n that basis, indigenous peoples could not look
 
to international law to affirm the rights that had o
nce been deemed to inhere in them by divine or
 
natural law. States, on the other hand, both sh
aped the rules of international law and enjoyed
 
1 
rights under it largely independent of interna
tional law 'considerations. States could create
 
"""'-- ""'- - _..,. -- ---·. ---.. 
doctrine to affirm and perfect their claims over i
ndigenous territories as a matter of internationa
l 
law, and treat the indigenous inhabitants accordi
ng to domestic policies, shielded from uninvited
 
outside scrutiny by international law itself. 
? 
'°'"" \. ~ \.c C.11)A ; \ 4:,~ · ~ -
The author argues that the right to self-determi
nation is ~ ~~o~~ ~ight. It is th~ ight to 
freely determine political status, economic, socia
l and cultural development. The right has been
 
declared in a number of international legal i
nstruments, and accepted as a component o
f 
customary international law. However, the auth
or also argues that legal right does not exist in 
a 
coherent legal framework. Rather, the right is 
applied to a variety of circumstances involving
 
delicate balancing of interests. 
In terms of structure, the author has chosen not
 to divide this paper into discrete sections. The
 
purpose of this paper is to identify the traditiona
l aspects of the principle of self-determination,
 
demonstrate the principle's evolution into a r
ight recognised at international law, and its
 
applicability to indigenous peoples. The author
 identifies the conflict between eurocentric and
 
indigenous foundations of the right to self-dete
rmination, and its evolution in the international
 
arena. The author argues that placing overt emph
asis on the nature of international law as 'law' 
ignores the historical reformulation of the conc
ept of self-determination that has occurred with
 
an evolution in jurisprudential and political disco
urse. 
With increased intensity over the last several yea
rs, the international community has maintained
 
indigenous peoples as special subjects of concer
n and sought co-operation to secure their rights
 
and well-being. That is, international law has ev
olved to incorporate entities other than States as
 
players in the international legal regime. States
 have duties at international law in relation to
 
indigenous peoples. The primary duty is the dut
y of States to secure enjoyment of human rights
 
and to provide remedies where the rights are vi
olated. The duty to secure enjoyment of human
 
rights is heightened in the context of indigeno
us peoples and extends beyond States to the
 
2 
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international community at large. In addition, the duty is implicit in customary international 
law". 
9 
The duty exists as contemporary recognition of centuries of eurocentrically based systemic 
........... _ -- -
oppre sion. The duty doe not necessitate assimilation or integration. The uty requires the 
implementation of contemporary treaty and customary norms grounded in the rinciple of self-
determination. 
C ~ 'f""? 
~AI '1 1 .tl. }-c 
3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The author contends that the right to self-deternunat1on is a group nght. It 1s the right to freely 
determine political status, economic, social and cultural development. The right has been 
declared in a number of international legal instruments, and accepted as a component of 
customary international law. However, the right does not exist in a coherent legal framework. 
Rather, the right is applied to a variety of circumstances involving delicate balancing of 
interests. 
A. Purpose 
The purpose of trus paper is to identify the traditional aspects of the principle of self-
determination, and demonstrate the principle's evolution into a right recognised at 
international law, and its applicability to indigenous peoples. 
B. Introducing the Evolwion 
For a period in history, international law was concerned only with the rights and duties of 
independent sovereign States. In that sense, international law disregarded the face of humanity 
beyond the sovereign. However, under the modem rubric of human rights international law is 
increasingly concerned with upholding rights deemed to inhere in human beings individualy as 
wel as colectively. Extending from core values of human freedom and equality. expressly 
associated with peoples instead of States, and affirmed in a number of intemauonal human 
rights instruments, the principle of self-determination arises within international law's human 
rights framework. It benefits al human beings as human beings, rather than sovereign entities. 
Therefore, like al human rights norms, self-determination is universal in scope and must be 
ssumed to benefit al segments of society. 
4 
-r-~ ~ ~~~
~ h;) ~~ 4°flv. ~~ 
C. A Working Concept 
l~ ~">,pi , :;;;(;) rL-
This paper identifir s t_!le C<.?,!lfl i.c.t between eurocentric and indigenous founda
tions of the right to 
self-determination and its evolution in the international arena. On one han
d self-determination --evolved from a olitical principle to its current status as a human right recognised by 
international law. For example: 
1 
[t]he concept of self-determination is virtually as old as the concept
 of Statehood 
itself. Since its inception self-determination has undergone dramatic
 alterations in 
many aspects, from a concept initially conservatively applied to i
ssues such as 
decolonisation, to a justification for the break-up of multi-ethnic State
s. 
On the other hand, however, the right to self-determination may have e
xisted since time 
immemorial. Nevertheless, Cassesse
2 argues that there is now sufficient consensus on the 
concept of self-determination of peoples. That is:
3 
Self-determination can either be external or internal. External self 
determination 
embodies the ability of a people to freely choose independence o
r union with 
other States. Internal self-determination usually means that a people 
in a sovereign 
State can elect and keep the government of its choice or that an 
ethnic. racial, 
religious or other minority within a sovereign State has the righ
t not to be 
oppressed by central government. 
The concept of self-detemtination has evolved to encompass a broad range
 of ideas and goals. 
Self-determination entails the devolution of political and economic power to
 indigenous peoples. 
In those te1ms control over decision making processes relative to political, social , 
economic and 
cultural status and development moves from States to indigenous groups. 
The author contends 
that placing overt emphasis on the nanire of international law as 'law' i
gnores the historical 
refo1mulation of the concept of self-dete1mination that has occurred w
ith an evolution in 
jurisprudential and political discourse. 
D. Central Premise 
~ \ ) --t;;) .. l.v ,~ '1-·. ~ 
((/Y\(~t''! ~ 
~ ~ ~ ~\,(.,£., ~ 
( "' ~ So, ~ai.J:) · 
It is the central premise of this paper that international law has developed be
yond utilisation as 
an instrument of colonialism to encompass the demands of indigenous peop
les. In the face of 
1 M Batistich "The Right to Self-Determination and International Law·· [19
95] AULR 1013. 
2 A Cassese Self Deten11i11atio11 of Peoples - A Legal Reappraisal (CUP, Cambrid
ge, 1996). 
·
1 Above n 2, 137. 
5 
tremendous adversity, indigenous peoples have long soug
ht to flourish as distinct 
communities on their ancestral lands, and they have endeavou
red to roll back inequities 
lingering as the result of historical patterns of colonisation. 
II. HISTORY 
What we now call international law can be traced to the natural law
 philosophies of 
Renaissance European theorists, which were in some measure
, although not 
entirely, sympathetic to indigenous peoples' existence as 
self-determining 
communities in the face of imperial onslaught. International law, h
owever, shed its 
naturalist frame as it changed into a state-centred system, strongly 
grounded in the 
Western world view; It developed to facilitate colonial pattern
s promoted by 
European States and their offspring, to the detriment of indigenous
 peoples." 
The author contends that Higgins's comments suggest the eurocen
tric political concept of self-
determination did not have its genesis as a political idea put fo
rth by Woodrow Wilson in 
response to international divisiveness subsequent to the Firs
t World War. Instead, the 
principle of self-determination developed in the eighteenth an
d nineteenth centuries as a 
corollary to national group demands for independence and autono
my. The author also submits 
~ (. that the principle's applicability was limited to nations within the territories o
f defeated 
~ ,rn~~mpires, and had little to do with the interests of peoples "unless [ demands J were consistent 
p with the geopolitical and strategic interests of the Great Powers". 
5 Self detennination was not 
recognised as a rule of international law because international la
w did not recognise national 
group expressions of separatist wishes as rights. 
A. Political Principle 
7Jvwh 
Iv,~~ 
,, ~l.)0~1~ 1 ' ;Y • 
In an advisory opinion the International Committee of Jurists 
favoured the supremacy of 
domestic legal systems and Parliamentary Sovereignty: For exam
ple: 6 
Positive international law does not recognise the right of national 
groups, as such, 
to separate themselves from the State of which they form part
 by the simple 
expression of a wish, any more than it recognises the right of othe
r States to claim 
such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the ri
ght to a portion 
of its population of determining its own political fate by plebisc
ite or by some 
4 SJ Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (OUP, New Yo
rk, 1996). 
5 H Hannum Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (UPP, 
Philadelphia, 1990) 28 . 
6 Report By the International Committee of Jurists ( 1920) 3 Journal of Le
ague of Nations 5. 
other method, is, exclusively, an attribute o
f the sovereignty of every State which is 
definitively constituted. 
The International Committee of Jurists ref
erred to the political consequences of sel
f-
determination in the context of the sovereignty
 debate raging between parties to the Treaty 
of 
Versailles 1919.
7 In doing so the Committee ignored the interna
l aspects of self-determination 
where" elf-rule implie meaningful participat
ion in the proc/ f government".
8 
The concept of self-determination was strict
ly a political principle, operating in a youn
g 
~ rnational legal system at a time when
 ' the notion of imp erialism was seen as rati
onal. 
States became the main players in the intern
ational legal regime. The formal and inform
al 
agreements between States, and State action 
stemming from those agreements, gave rise 
to 
both formal
9 and less formal international law. 
10 
B. Underlying Difficulties 
The underlying difficulties wit the principle
 of self-determination persisted beyond 191
9. 
w..i.:~i.W..IL.lQJ.W!e,5.,.;Ceflfl"e:o on the content of the
 principle, and its applicability. Formulations
 
of the principle of self-determination embo
died notions of subjectivity and objectivity
. 
Subjectivity and objectivity were often con
fusingly intertwined. For example, Higgin
s 
asserts: 11 
The designating of States as 'subjects' wit
hin the international legal system in turn 
led to an embracing, especially by the le
ading jurists of the positivist school of 
international law, of the position that u
nder a legal system there exist only 
'objects' and 'subjects'. This starting 
point has received a widespread and 
uncritical acceptance and has necessa
rily dictated the framework of any 
examination. We have all been held capti
ve by a doctrine that stipulates that all 
international law is to be divided into 'su
bjects' - that is, those elements bearing, 
without the need for municipal interve
ntion, rights and responsibilities; and 
'objects' - that is, the rest. Certain author
s have contended vigorously that only 
States are the subjects of international 
law. And to the positivist there is no 
permissive rule of international law that 
allows individuals to be the bearers of 
rights and duties. They must, therefore. 
be objects: that is to say, they are like 
'boundaries' or 'rivers' or 'territory' or a
ny of the other chapter headings found 
in the traditional textbooks. 
7 Above n 6, 6. 
8 A Cassese United Nations Law: Fundamenta
l Rights (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, AADR. 1979
) 137, 165. 
9 The Treaty and legislation aspects of interna
tional law. 
10 The custom and opinio juris sense. 
11 R Higgins International Law and How We U
se It (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) 47. 
7 
Underpinning those notions was the perpetuation of international aw's applicability to States, 
rather than international law extending to include as participants those entities who did not 
meet the broad criteria for Statehood.12 Despite its political significance, consequent upon the 
establishment of the United Nations regime in 1945, the principle was not immediately 
recognised as a fundamental right. Groups seeking to utilise the principle of self-
determination were required to be distinctive entities embodying objectively determinable 
common characteristics. Those characteristics included language, history, ethnicity or 
religion. However, the objective application of strict terms of reference failed to recognise 
contemporaneous membership of a multiplicity of groups. In addition, ob·ectively 
determinable common characteristics were eurocentricaly defined. On those ground , 
subjective and objective divisions as the basis for a determination of membership of groups 
entitled to self-determination posed problems for the formulation of a succinct concept. 
C. Participation 
The author submits that indigenous peoples, not qualifying as States, could nor participate in 
the shaping of international law. On that basis, indigenous peoples could not look to 
international law to affirm the rights that had once been deemed to inhere in them by divine or 
natural law. States, on the other hand, both shaped the rules of international law and enjoyed 
rights under it largely independent of international law considerations. States could create 
doctrine to affirm and perfect their claims over indigenous te1Titories as a mater of 
international law, and treat the indigenous inhabitants according to domestic policies, shielded 
from uninvited outside scrutiny by international law itself. 
D. The United Nations 
~~ ~~ 
It is arguable whether the creation of the United Nations in 194513 impacted upon the nanH"e 
of the principle of self-determination to the extent that it was eurocentricaly recognised as a 
right at international law. It is less contentious that the United Nations as an institution has 
12 Article J, Montevideo Convention 1933. The 'State' as an entity at international law should possess as its 
characteristics the folowing qualification -a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government and 
d) capacity to enter into relations with other States. The concept of Statehood is not immutable. (my 
emphasis). 
8 
I 
acted as a catalyst for the evolution of international legal rights, both in terms of the nature of 
the concept of self-determination and recognition of groups pursuing their right to self-
determination. In addition, the United Nations, its organs, sub-organs, committees, sub-
committees and working groups, has provided a forum for participation and recognition of 
entities other than States, under the cloak of which the political principle of self-determination 
has evolve~:te0~ le~ to + nation 
III. JURISPRUDENCE 
Like all systems of law, international law is the product of historical as well as modern 
l lements. International law especially is rooted in jurisprudential strains originating in classical 
/
~Western legal thought, although today it is increasingly influenced by non-western actors and 
perspectives. The subject of indigenous peoples is not new to this genre of law but has figured 
with varying degrees of prominence in the legal discourse and practice related to mternational 
law's evolution over centuries. 
A. Ignoring the Obvious 
l International 'law' has been, and continues to be, the subject of jurisprudential analysis by 
0-. VC) \(/v _::nli@_tened s,s:holars. 14 The validity of international 'law' 15 as true 'law'
16 has been analysed 
to prove either its existence or non-existence, and the invalidity or validity of arguments 
based on its negation or assertion. This paper will avoid that task. Not because academic ) 
analysis of that kind is unimportant, but because that analysis invariably leads one into an 
infinite regress, doing little to advance the debate. To assert the invalidity of an international 
Vlur legal instrument or international law works as a means to ignore the reality that indigenous 
Vl(C~°'"\tfoples play important roles in international and political affairs, based on the significant 
evolution that the concept of self-determination has undergone. ~Y h , ( 
~" ~~ ~ '1 ~ ~ H ,. ~ ..,,"""' ,c, 
13 Subsequent to World War 2, under the United Nations Charter 1945. 
14 See H Lauterpacht The Function of Law in the lntemational Community (Garland, London, 1974); A 
d' Amato lntemational Law: Process and Prospect (TPI, New York, 1987). Some scholarship is impenetrable.
 
See for example M Koskeniemmi From Apology to Eutopia (OUP, London, 1989). 
15 In terms of custom, treaties, international instruments and opinio juris. 
16 Embodying that elusive concept 'bindingness'. 
9 
Obviously, international law as a concept cannot be totally ignored in the context of an 
international law paper, nor can one ignore the rights asserted cons the existence 
of the international legal regime. On that basis. the author adopts Higginsian
17 pproach to 
the nature of international law and the international legal system ba d on 'funct' ality '. 
B. Jurisprudential Conflicts 
vxph'~ 
Higgins 18 argues that international law has traditionally been defined by those to whom it is 
said to apply. Classically, international law applies to States as subjects. 
19 Objects20 of 
international law are entities requiring provision of rights by the subjects of international law. 
The criteria for Statehood is generally circumscribed by the Montevideo Convention 1933.
21 
However, the "classic definition of [international law] as law binding on [s]tates has been 
expanded to include also international organisations". 
22 Yet, to the positivist "there is no 
perrruss1ve rule of international law that allows individuals to be bearers of rights and 
duties". 23 
Neve1theless, if one accepts that international law is more than a body of rules to be applied, 
and encompasses flexible norms responsive to the needs of a variety of entities involved in 
decision-making processes, entities at international law include international organisations 
and individuals. In that sense individuals are more than mere objects at international law.() lfl 
Higgins argues that it is not particularly helpful either intellectually or operationally, to rely on 
the subject-object dichotomy that runs through so much of the writings. It is more helpful, 
and closer to perceived reality, to return to the view of international law as a particular 
decision-making process. Within that process (which is a dynamic and not a static one) there 
are a variety of participants, making claims across state lines, with the object of maximisi~g(l_ 
various values. ~ t 'V\N cl- ~ ~
~IA r tJtJ7. 
"'I\ (IA./\ ~ en 11. Dame Roslyn Higgins is a renowned scholar of international law. Her recent work develops the
 
I"\ ·~ <1pproach to the international legal regime, providing answers to the often
 seemingly 
msun11ountable"objections to the existence of international laws ' status as 'law ' . 
18 Above n JI, 48. 
19 ·subjects' of international law are those entities bearing rights, and having responsibilities at international
 
law. 
20 'Objects ' of international law are those entities requiring the municipal provision of rights . 
2 1 Above n 12. 
22 Above n 11, 48. 
23 Above n 11 , 49. 
10 
For example: 24 
If peoples entitled to self determination are the entire peoples of a [S]tate, then it 
becomes unnecessary to answer the difficult question of whether a particular 
minority group ... are peoples for purposes of self determination under Article I of 
the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights L 966] . 
Higgins25 recognises the fundamental jurisprudential conflicts at variance m this complex 
area. Underpinning the ubiquitous naturalist/positivist debate are the difficulties surrounding 
international law's recognition as law. Arguments for the existence of a right to self-
determination based on international law are weak when one cannot argue that the rules 
fo1mulated by a range of means within the international sphere actually constitute 'law', in the 
sense that the international rules relied upon have some binding quality. 
C. Operation 
Domestic legal regimes are hierarchical, and a 'Parliament' in the domestic sense does not 
exist in the international forum. In that sense, an international hierarchy comparable to 
domestic legal systems is non-existent without a sovereign Parliament. The international 
arena operates on a horizontal plane, each paiticipant in that arena being equal.
26 The 
fundamental opposition to the status of self-determination as a legal right hinges on the 
conflict between perceptions of international and domestic law.
27 Domestic rules constitute 
·1aw' when proffered by domestic Parliaments, so self-determination cannot be a legal right if 
not so conferred. 28 <7 ~ 1 ~II' ' .• 
D. Predispositions 
It is clear that perceptions about the nature and sources of law predispose one to the adoption 
of ce1tain lines of ai·gument about rights consequent upon the existence or non-existence of 
24 Above n 11, 126. 
25 Above n 11. 
26 'Equality' exists as an ideal. rather than a reality. 
27 The natural law v positivist debate. 
28 Domestic recognition of international law through custom or ratification can equate to conferral. 
11 
that law. For example,~ and Koskeniemmi30 are boxed into frameworks based on 
their deconstructive ideals. Deconstructive analyses of international law focus on a lack of 
international law's binding quality, in attempts at invalidating its existence as 'true law'. 
Deconstructive analyses mitigate against the existence of the legal right to self-determination 
because international law lacks a binding character. On that basis, Casses7 and ~ 04 eniemrni 
question the legal status of concepts based on presumably non-en s\~nt fe¾li foundations. 
ych an objection assumes that the jurisprudential quality of the domestic legal system and 
V the laws it creates exceeds that of the international legal system. In fact, that is the basis for 
f the divergence between positivist and alternative conceptions of the legal right to self-
( 
0
'' ; ) determination at its core. That is, there are ways to view the legal paradigm other than wjth 
:/'" · positivist eyes. To assume the falsity of systems because law's binding character is 
(.ovt~" conceptualised in a way different to the positivist notion locks one into a mindset devoid of 
the richness and vigour developing in international law. 41'v~ 1 fl-.-.-4.. Sc~./~ r>,,o"5{ 
On that basis, Anaya3 1 argues that a belief in the naturalist ideal, the existence of fundamental ? 
human rights in existence by virtue of human existence, renders illusory the positivist notion 
that rights are created when they are proffered by Parliament in the domestic legal regime. 
The author favours Anaya's argument because positivism is too restrictive in international law 
discourse. That is, deconstructive positivist analyses ignore reality. 
Where positivists are prepared to accept the existence of the international legal system then 
States are the players in that system. Naturally, such an argument meets opposition by those 
who adhere to the belief that, at international law, there exist players other than, and in 
addition to States. 
E. Evolution in a System of Normative Conduct )~ 11 r,-~ ~~ 7. 
Higgins" asserts that, unlike domestic legL emational 'law' is not purely about --rules. It is a n01mative system, the basis for Higgins's argument being that all organised 
groups and structures require a system of normative conduct in order to operate effectively:
33 
29 Above n 2, 170. 
30 M Koskeniemmi From Apology to £utopia (OUP, London, 1989). See also M Koskeniemmi ' 'The Politics 
of International Law" ( 1990) 1 EHL 4. 
31 Above n 2, I 78 . 
32 Above n I I. 
33 Above n 11, I. 
12 
[t]hat is to say, conduct which is regarded by each actor, and by the group as a 
whole, as being obligatory, and for which violation carries a price. Normative 
systems make possible that degree of order if society is to maximise the common 
good. The role of law is to provide an operational system for securing values that 
we all desire - security. freedom, the provision of sufficient material goods. It is 
not, as commonly supposed, about resolving disputes. In these essentials 
international law is no different from domestic law. [Howe er] consent and 
sovereignty are constraining factors against which the prescribing, invoking, and 
applying of international law norms must operate. 
Faced with the normative international legal system positivists may object to Higgins's 
assertion on the grounds that international 'laws' actually constitute rules meant to be 
impartially applied, but which are frequently ignored because of the absence of centralised 
sanctions.34 However, to Higgins rules are merely accumulated past decisions because if 
international law was just 'rules' it would indeed be unable to contribute to, and cope with. a 
changing political world: 35 
To rely merely on accumulated past decisions (rules) when the context in which 
they were articulated has changed - and indeed when their content is often unclear 
- is to ensure that international law will not be able to contribute to today's [issues 
and problems] and, further, that it will be disobeyed for that reason. International 
law is a normative choice-making process. 
( 
The au~hor contends t~at inter_nati~nal law, like domestic_ l_aw, is cont~nu~ly evolving and. ~ 
recognised by the United Nations mvolves as players ent1t1es such as md1genou~ · ople . 
6 
International law is also undergoing a process of revolution, because at it's nception 
international law was created by States for States. However, the author also co nds that an 
international legal evolution to encompass recognition, implicit or explicit, of customary law 
is not new to the basis of international law itself. Custom in the form of the practises of States 
has long been viewed as a source of international law . On that basis, the author submits that 
the legal revolution gets its freshness from a renewed focus on opinio juris as a form of 
international law, and the most persuasive opinio juris asserts that fundamental rights exist by 
virtue of one's existence as a human being.
37 That is. one' s rights are inherent to being 
human, and the right to self-determination is one of those rights. On that basis, the right to 
> 
"';eJf-determmahon consututes an mtemational law. )~ ~ .... ~ VI ot- { of! f-, 
"( ol12.-~0vts~ . 
34 Aboven2, 174. 11( hv..tc~ Lo~~  ( ~ ~ 
35 Above n 11 , 3. See generally H Lauterpacht The Function of/ Law in the /11temational Community 
(Garland, London, 1974). 
36 And to a lesser extent 'minorities'. The 'minority ' rights regime is generally circumscribed by the United 
Nations Charter 1945, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, and a multiplicity of 
domestic rights legislation. 'Minority' issues, except where applicable to the notions of ·indigenous' or 
'peoples' are outside the scope of this paper. 
F. International by Necessity 
Entities purporting to exist as equivalents to States within the domestic legal sphere pose 
threats to the territorial integrity of the particular State, and in the case of indigenous 'peoples' 
the threat is primarily to the State's internal territorial integrity. The author submits that, when 
viewed from an international law perspective, it is simplistic to assume the consequence of 
the existence of indigenous 'peoples' within the States territory to necessarily be internal 
division. 
/
Nev rtheless, domestic legal systems which are adherent to the positivist ideal perpetuate the 
s premacy of Parliament. That is, all other entities within the State' s territory operate as 
subservient to the domestic Parliament. In that sense there is little room for evolut10n 
/[ 
encompassing indigenous 'peoples' as players in domestic legal spheres. However, the 
author supports keeping the fo~ indigenous legal rights within the international legal 
regime. Doing so allows the legal · ght to self-determination to be analysed in terms of its 
rights centred content. 
IV. EMERGENCEOFTIIELEGALRlG~ r\Jr/lr-< ~-
"' "" '/"' IN' J 7 
e Charter of the United Nations placed positive duties on States "to promote and encourage 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion".38 Szego described the principle as 'lex imperfecta' since "[it] did 
not rise to the level of international law at the time the United Nations Chaiter was drafted".
39 
Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations states: 
The Purposes of the United Nations [include] .. 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to 
take appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace. 
37 Above n 4, 60. 
38 Article 1, United Nations Charter 1945 . The United Nations Charter referred to the principle of self-
determination twice. both times in the context of developing friendly relations among nations, and in 
conjunction with the notion of equal rights of peoples. See also Articles I (2) and 55. 
39 H Szego New States and International Law (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1970) 62, 65. 
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Atticle 55 of the Charter of the United Nations states: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote -
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic. social, health. and related 
problems; and international cultural and international co-operation ; 
and 
c. universal respect for. and observance of. human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. 
ked Nations adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948. It 
contained a preambular reference to the development of friendly relations between nations, 
and outlined the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all individuals are entitled. 
However, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 failed to mention the principle of 
self-determination. 
A. Evolution from Political to Legal, and Domestic to International 
3/Principle of self-determination evolved into a right recognised by international law with 
/ ~ea~option of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Coloma! 
Countries and Peoples ("Resolution 1514")_.io Resolution 1514 applied to colonial countries 
and the peoples therein. Preambular paragraph two declared that "peoples have the right to 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development"_.i, 
Des · e Resolution 1514 exemplifying a change in the principle's focus from political 
e pediency to legal rights definitional ambiguity persisted. The notion of 'peoples' was the 
foundation upon which the principle rested, though 'peoples' were not defined. On that basis 
Hannum42 argued that the precise ambit of the applicability of the principle of self-
determination was unclear. Hannun questioned whether the concept of 'peoples' ought to be 
read in its general sense since it was not clear from preambular paragraph two whether 
.io United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), (1960) 15 UN Doc A/4684 . 
.i, Above n 40. See preambular paragraph two. 
42 Above n 39, 35. 
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peoples had to exist within colonial territories before the principle of self-determination could 
apply to them.4 3 
On the other hand, it has been argued that Resolution 1514 applied solely to peoples under 
colonial rule, and continues to do so.44 However, Higgins has argued that the necessity of 
bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations 
nullified the existence of the right outside the context of de-colonialisation.45 
Resolution 1514 was premised on the need for international and domestic stability, peace and 
respect for human rights. Its preamble States in part:46 
The Declaration relates the normative development in the field of human rights to 
the rights of national groups, and, in particular the right of self-determination. The 
Declaration, in conjunction with the United Nations Charter, supports the view that 
self-determination is now a legal principle, and, although its precise ramifications 
are not yet determined, the principle has great significance as a root of particular 
legal developments. 
The author contends that Higgins's assertions were based on the adoption of the United 
Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States47 ("Resolution 2625"). That is, the principle of self-determination 
came to apply to peoples existing in non-colonial situations. In fact, Resolution 2625 
represented the first time in history that the conditions and parameters of self-determination 
were extended to encompass peoples in the general sense. However, Resolution 2625 
discouraged the dismemberment of States, placing emphasis instead on the concept of internal 
self-determination:48 
Nevertheless, in the context of post-1945 de-colonialism, it soon became evident that the 
primary, and often sole definition of peoples was that of non-European inhabitants of former 
colonies. Apart from the fact of colonisation itself, little regard was had for the ethnicity, 
language, religion, or other objective characteristics of colonised peoples. Territory, rather 
than 'nationhood' determined the extent of people's rights .. 
43 Above n 5. 
4-1 Above n 5. 
45 Above n 40. See preambular paragraph two. 
46 Above n 40. 
47 General Assembly Resolution 2625 ( 1970) 25 UN Doc A/5217. 
48 Above n 5. Hallum interchanges the terms de-colonialism, de-colonisation and anti-colonialism. For the 
purposes of this paper the terms do not differ. See also T Kirgis 'The Degrees of Self-Determination in the 
United Nations Era" (1988) AJIL 304. 
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B. Status : ]us Cogens or Lex Imperfecta 
By applying a eurocentric framework to an indigenous idea Brownlie has argued that the 
'right' to self-determination constitutes a p~ erv.ptory norm of inte~ iongl law:49 
fv.,1'....- °"•<11~ 
Affirmed in the United Nations Charter and other major international instruments, 
self-determination is widely acknow edged to be a principle of customary 
international law and even jus cogen3, a peremptory norm. Mention of self-
determination within contemporary political discourse has at times raised the 
spectre of destabilisation and even violent turmoil. And indeed, as many have 
observed, self-determination rhetoric has been invoked in the world of late in 
association with extremist political posturing and ethnic chauvinism. 
The author supports Brownlie's argument, and contends that a number of States have resisted 
express usage of the term 'self-determination' in articulating indigenous people's rights. 
Putting rhetorical extremism to one side. the concept underlying the term 'self-determination' 
entails a certain nexus of widely shared values. Those values include unity and communality 
Those values and related decision-making processes can be seen as stabilising forces in the 
international system, and as foundational to international law's contemporary treatment of 
indigenous peoples. 
A 'peremptory' n01m is not open to denial or challenge. Peremptory norms are often known 
as jus cogens, rules or principles of international law that are so fundamental they bind all 
States without exception. Peremptory norms amount to jus cogens if they are recognised as 
such by the international community as a whole, and States cannot create regional customary 
international law that contradicts jus cogens rules. 50 On the other hand it has been asserted 
that the principle of self-determination is "unworthy of the appellation of a rule of law" .
51 For 
example: 52 
The 'right of self-determination' ... has never been recognised as a genuine positive 
right of 'peoples' of universal and impartial application, and it never will, nor can 
it be so recognised in the future. It would indeed in its general implementation 
prove a constant source of disruption and subversion, and the international legal 
order of established States will never be prepared to acknowledge with sincerity its 
universal existence as a matter of law or right. 'Peoples' may fight for it and win 
or lose; they may succeed in persuading their own State to grant it by peaceful 
agreement, or fail, completely or in part, to do so. But it is one of those realities of 
international life which do not lend themselves to rigid regulation by law, that is, by 
a mandatory rule, impartially applying and applied to all identical cases and 
susceptible of a juristic definition. And for the sake of the law itself it is better that 
49 I Brownlie Principles of Public lntemational Law (3ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) 75. 
50 EA Martin (ed) Concise Oxford Dictionary of Law (2ed. OUP, London, 1992) 224. 
51 JHW Verzijil International Law in Historical Perspective (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Leiden, 1968). 
52 Above n 5 I, I. 
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it should remain so, for, worse than leaving the issue at the mercy of the unceasing 
political game would be to create a rule of law which would from the outset be 
inevitably infected by an ineradicable taint of international hypocrisy, and 
therefore unworthy of the appellation rule of law .. .It is inherently impossible for it 
[self-determination] to form a universal basis of concrete rights and obligations 
under international law and accordingly it invariably presents itself in practice as a 
scarcely veiled instance of measuring two measures. 
On the other hand, Espiell also believes that the right to self-determination is jus cogens. Today 
no one can challenge the fact that, in light of contemporary incernationai realities, the principle of 
self-determination necessarily possesses the character of jus cogens. 53 
C. The Need for Coherence 
Unlike Brownlies4 Espiell conceptualises a limited form of the right to self-determination on the 
grounds that the United Nations has established the right of self-determination a a right of 
peoples under colonial and alien domination.ss Espiell argues that the right to self-determination 
does not apply to peoples already organised in the form of a State, which are not under colonial 
and alien domination. That is:56 
Resolution 1514 (XV) and other United Nations instruments condemn any attempt 
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity 
of a country. If, however, beneath the guise of ostensible national unity, colonial 
and alien domination does in fact exist, whatever legal formula may be used in an 
attempt to conceal it, the right of the subject people concerned cannot be 
disregarded without international law being violated. 
The author contends that a coherent framework based on human rights law needs to be 
developed that facilitates resolution of competing claims relative to the right of self-
determination. The rules expounded in this framework must be able to be applied to a variety 
of circumstances without creating an increased threat to international peace and security while 
respecting the rights and interests of all members of the international community. 
53 HG Espiell Implementation of United Nations Resolutions Relating to th e Right of Peoples Under 
Colonial and Alien Domination to Self-Determination, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights (UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/390, 1977) para 
63, 17. 
54 Above n 49. 
55 HG Espiell "Self-Determination and Jus Cogens" in A Cassesse (ed) United Nations Law I Fundamental 
Rights (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, AADR, I 979) I 67. 
56 Above n 55, I 67. 
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United Nations Resolutions 1514 and 2625 were unanimously adopted. A range of other 
United Nations resolutions reiterate the ' right' of peoples to self-determination.57 In addition, 
the majority of members of the United Nations became parties to both the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1966 at its inception.58 "It would seem difficult to question [the principle 
of self-determination's] status as a right at international law".59 
V. SOVEREIGNTY 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the expansion of colonialism greatly 
increased the number and diversity of indigenous populations under colonial rule. 
A. Traditional or Functional 
Sovereignty, as both an idea and institution, lies at the heart of the modem and 
therefore Western experience of space and time. It is integral to the structure of 
Western thought with its stress on dichotomies and polarities and to a geogra'lohical 
discourse in which territory is sharply demarcated and exclusively controlled. 
Cassese61 represents a facet of international legal scholarship averse to the func6onal 
approach to international law posited by Higgins.62 Cassese purports to assess the extent to 
which the principle of self-determination has impacted upon existing international legal 
norms, and in doing so adopts a jurisprudentially restrictive stance. Cassese does not argue 
that the right to self-determination is applicable to indigenous peoples. Instead, Cassese limits 
the focus of the right to instances of decolonisation. In that regard Cassese is locked into 
consideration of pertinent issues relative to colonial experiences. However, Cassese does not 
dispute indigenous 'peoples' status as peoples, though considers that where an indigenous 
57 For example General Assembly Resolutions 2535 (XXIVB) ( 1970); 2144 (XXV) ( 1970); 3236 (XXIX) 
(1974). 
·
18 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966, and entered into force on 3 January 1976. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on I 6 
December 1966, and entered into force on 23 March 1976. 
59 Above n I I, 45 . 
6° FH Hinsley Sovereignty (CUP, New York. 1986) 11. 
6 1 Above n 2. 
62 Above n I I . 
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peoples were under colonial domination but are no longer, indigenous peoples cannot assert 
the right to self-determination.63 
Cassese argues that "the principle and rules [about] self-determination have extended their 
influence and sway to a traditional part of international law - that governing modes of 
acquisition, transfer and loss of legal title over territory".64 However, the evolutionary right 
to self-determination has not invalidated traditional legal bases of title:65 
However, a legal process, starting with the League of Nations mandate system, 
followed by the United Nations trusteeship system and compounded by the 
gradual emergence of legal rules on self-determination, has led to the emergence 
of a set of legal obligations for those countries still enjoying sovereignty over 
colonial territories. 
Prima facie, Cassese's argument appears liberal because Cassesse advocates the realisation of 
the right to self-determination within the framework surrounding United Nations Resolution 
1514. However, with respect Cassese advocates restrictive legalism in ignorance of the reality 
that indigenous peoples play important roles in their domestic political and legal systems, and 
the international political and legal system. The author contends that international obligations 
make it incumbent on former colonial States to enable the people of their former colonial 
territories to freely choose whether to opt for independent Statehood, or association or 
integration within an existing State. 
Cassesse's argument is grounded in the continued reliance on non-binding resolutions at 
international law66 , and on arguments against the nature and validity of international law. 67 At 
best, such arguments allow critical legal scholars to restrict the evolution of the right to self-
determination within barriers apposite to its rights based nature. In doing so the functional 
approach is denied in favour of the perpetuation of domestic Parliamentary sovereignty and 
Statehood at international law. At their worst, deconstructive analyses allow scholars like 
Cassese to dismiss the validity, existence and evolution of the right to self-determination, 
without advancing the debate.68 
6
' Above n 2, 184. 
6
-1 Above n 2, 185. 
65 Above n 2, 186. 
66 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) is an example. 
67 An approach contrary to the functional approach advocated by both Higgins and Anaya. See above n 11 and 
above n 4 . 
68 Cassese is not alone. In recent times Koskeniemmi has argued the deconstructive analysis . See above n 30. 
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On one hand Cassese adopts Higgins's jurisprudence when Higgins commented on the 
stance of the United Nations General Assembly to the principle of self-determination as it 
existed in the 1950s and 1960s. Higgins stated:69 
For the moment it suffices to note that, notwithstanding the cautious way in which 
self-determination is referred to in the [United Nations] Charter. there began in the 
1950s to be a moral stand taken on the issue by the General Assembly. At first, 
several of the colonial powers resisted the idea that there was a legal right of self-
determination. It was, in their view, merely a political aspiration. But graduaJly their 
resistance to the idea of a legal right became more muted. They accepted broader 
interpretations of their duties ... especially in terms of the provision of information 
to the United Nations on political progress. The development of the concept of 
self-determination was historically bound up with decolonisation - with the 
growing agreement that it was obligatory to bring forward dependent peoples to 
independence if they so chose. 
On the other hand, Cassese70 takes Higgins ' s arguments out of context. and uses that 
jurisprudence selectively. Cassese fails to recognise that Higgins went on to argue: 71 
It came further to be accepted that the right of self-determination was applicable 
not only to peoples under colonial rule, but also to peoples subject to foreign or 
alien domination. This was spelled out in the United Nations Declaration on 
Friendly Relations of 1970, which has been widely invoked on this point...The 
Declaration speaks of self-determination being available in situations of 
colonialism, and the 'subjection of peoples to alien subjugation , domination and 
exploitation'. 
VI. THE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT 
Anaya argues that the concept of self-determination derives from philosophkal affirmation of 
the human drive to translate aspiration into reality, coupled with postulates of inherent human 
quality.72 In doing so Anaya concedes the right to self-determination' s illusory character. That 
is, "perhaps no contemporary norm of international law has been so vigorously promoted or 
widely accepted as the right of all peoples to self-determination .. . yet the meaning and content 
of that right remains vague and imprecise".73 
69 Above n 11 , 112. 
70 Above n 2, 187. 
71 Above n 11, 115 . 
72 Above n 2, 75 . 
73 Above n 39, 27. 
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A. Recognition 
The right to self-determination is ambiguous. On the one hand the content of the right to self-
determination seems to be generally accepted. However, what this actually means is not clear. 
Many declarations and conventions have recognised the right to self-determination. 
Nevertheless, to a large extent recognition has been confined to the right for those under 
colonial control to be free of such control within the context of their own States or territories. 
From a eurocentric perspective territories have traditionally been defined by colonial borders and 
State practice. 
The author contends that it is remarkable how a concept widely recognised as being central to 
the achievement of profound change remains so ephemeral and difficult to define. The concept 
of self-determination draws from a number of areas of international law. It is an amalgamation 
of numerous principles. Included in its ambit are the notions of territonal acquisition, territorial 
integrity, recognition and Statehood. Batistich74 argues that the extent to which those principles 
are applied delineates the boundaries of the right to self-determination. That is: 75 
The resistance toward acknowledging self-determination as implying rights for 
literally all peoples is founded on the misconception that self-determination in its 
fullest sense means a right to independent Statehood, even if the right is not to be 
exercised right away or is to be exercised to achieve some alternative status. This 
misconception is often reinforced by reference to decolonisation, which has 
involved the transformation of colonial territories into new States. 
B. Peoples 
Although self-determination presumptively benefits all human beings, its linkage with the term 
peoples in international instruments indicates the collective or group characteristic of the 
principle. Self-determination is concerned with human beings, not simply as individuals with 
autonomous will but more as social creatures engaged in the constitution and functioning of 
communities. In its plain meaning the term peoples undoubtedly embraces the multitude of 
indigenous groups the world over. 
Authoritative definitions of 'peoples' do not exist. At international law the term implies the 
right to self-determination. International legal instruments make distinctions between 
7
-1 Above n 1, 1016. 
75 Above n 4, 80. 
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'peoples' and 'minorities' 76 within a State. Those instruments do not make the distinction 
clearly. "There is nothing within the confines of the self-determination formula to give 
guidance on the definition and concretisation of the self'.77 
Historically, groups seeking to utilise the principle of self-determination were required to be 
distinctive entities embodying objectively determinable common characteristics. Those 
characteristics included language, history, ethnicity or religion. However, the objective 
application of strict te1ms of reference failed to recognise contemporaneous membership of a 
multiplicity of groups.78 
It is not difficult to conceptualise indigenous groups falling within the broad 'peoples' 
concept.79 The author contends that legalistic limitations on the right to self-determination are 
merely perpetuations of eurocentric concepts to fundamental human rights, in attempts to 
artificially delineate the boundaries of those rights. The only way indigenous rights are 
currently recognised is through the utilisation of procedures under a eurocentric construct 
such as the United Nations, and despite legal formulations of the right political expediency 
outweighs international law. 
Indigenous peoples consider the right to self-determination a natural right, in existence by 
virtue of being human. The right to self-dete1mination does not need to be delineated in 
international legal instruments. In that sense, a 'right' need not exist in eurocentric terms for 
that right to exist. The author submits that when international and domestic legal systems 
have favoured eurocentric objective criteria as measurements of the existence or non-existence 
of indigenous peoples and their right to self-dete1mination those systems have been incorrect. 
Nevertheless, despite rhetoric to the contrary, various United Nations member States 
perpetuate historically paternalistic attitudes towards indigenous populations.80 
76 For example Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 refers specifically 
to the rights of minorities. However, minorities do not have the right to self-determination. Instead, 
minorities have rights to retention of cultural identity. 
77 R McCorquodale ''Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach" (1994) 43 IntCompLQ 857, 866. 
78 In addition to failing to recognise that peoples can change over time, or created to achieve certain political or 
social ends. 
79 Article 3 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1993 States: indigenous peoples 
have the right to self-determination . By virtue of that right they freely detem1ine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
80 New Zealand is an example. In response to calls for submissions on a revision of the Draft Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1993 the New Zealand Government expressed concern that a notion of 
'indigenous' in accordance with reality and not limited by legal technicalities would result in indigenous 
peoples' secession as a corollary of the right to self determination. On that basis the New Zealand Government 
sought adoption of a conjunctive definition of the tern1 'indigenous peoples ' that precluded the right to self-
determination as a means of protecting against threats to its territorial integrity. See Mana Tangata: Draft 
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C. Contemporary Recognition 
In 1982 the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples was established as a result of a proposal by 
the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. Members of the Working Group were provided by State members of the United 
Nations. In fact, the international legal system's contemporary treatment of indigenous peoples 
is the result of political and legal activity over the last few decades. That activity has involved, 
and substantially been driven by, indigenous peoples themselves. Indigenous peoples have 
ceased to be mere objects of the discussion of their rights and have become real participants in 
an extensive multilateral dialogue that also has engaged States, non-governmental organisations, 
and independent experts, a dialogue facilitated by human rights organs of international 
institutions. 
For example, on 12 April 1996 the United Nations Human Rights Commission began formal 
consideration of the rights of indigenous peoples. Members of the Human Rights Commission 
expressed support for the establishment of a permanent forum for indigenous peoples within the 
United Nations system. The Human Rights Commission's views heralded the first indication 
that the United Nations member States viewed indigenous groups as players in the international 
legal arena. 8 1 Nevertheless: 82 
The historical violations of indigenous peoples' self-determination, together with 
contemporary inequities against indigenous peoples, still cast a dark shadow on the 
legitimacy of state authority, regardless of effective control or the law 
contemporaneous with historical events. 
Indigenous communities consider the concept of self-determination essential to an ability to 
control their own destinies. Formulations of the legal "right" to self-deternlination range from 
the expansive to the to the extremely expansive, even though at first those formulations may 
appear specific. For example, "All indigenous peoples have the right of self-detemlination. By 
Declaration 011 the Rights of Indigenous Peoples-Background and Discussion 011 Key Issues (Wellington, Te 
Puni Kokiri, 1994). 
81 United Nations Human Rights Commission Press Release ( 12 April I 996. HR/CN/733). 
82 Above n 4, 86. 
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virtue of this right they may freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social, religious and cultural development".83 In the extremely expansive vein: 84 
All indigenous nations and peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue 
of which they have the right to whatever degree of autonomy or self-government 
they choose. This includes the right to freely determine their political status, freely 
pursue their own economic, social, religious and cultural development, and 
determine their own membership and/or citizenship, without external interference ... 
No State shall assert any jurisdiction over an indigenous nation of people, or its 
territory, except in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the nation or 
people concerned ... 
Indigenous nations and peoples may engage in self-defence against State actions in 
conflict with their right to self-determination. 
D. Indigenous 
As empire building and colonial settlement proceeded ... those who already 
inhabited the encroached-upon lands and who were subjected to oppressive forces 
became known as indigenous, native or aboriginal. Such designations have 
continued to apply to people by virtue of their place and condition within the life-
altering human encounter set in motion by colonialism.85 
Commonly accepted definitions of 'indigenous' are difficult to delineate. "The United Nations 
generally refrains from attempting tight definitions, which may limit the flexibility of 
Governments and peoples in applying relevant instruments to their own national 
circumstances". 86 Today, the term "indigenous" refers broadly to the living descendants of 
inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Indigenous peoples, nations or communities are 
culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces 
of empire and conquest. They are indigenous because their ancestral lands are embedded in the 
lands in which they live, or would like to live, much more deeply than more powerful sectors of 
society living in close proximity on the same lands. Furthermore, they are peoples to the extent 
they comprise distinct communities with a continuity of existence and identity that links them to 
the communities, tribes or nations of their ancestral past. 
83 Principle I of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples Declaration of Principles Adopted 
at the Fourth General Assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (Panama, 1984). 
84 Draft Declaration of Principles Proposed by the Indian Law Resource Centre, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 
Four Directions Council, National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service, National Indian Youth Council COi(/ 
the International Indian Treaty Council ( 1984). 
85 Above n 4, 3. 
86 First Session of the Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva 1995. This perspective 
is echoed by the New Zealand Government in Mana Tangata. See above n 84. 
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E. Redressing the Imbalance 
The International Labour Organisation has made significant attempts to address particular issues 
faced by indigenous peoples. The author contends that discussions of indigenous people' s 
rights at international law are incomplete without a discussion of self-determination, a principle 
of the highest order within the contemporary international system. Indigenous peoples have 
repeatedly articulated their demands in terms of self-determination. In turn, the evolution in the 
concept of self-determination from a political to legal right has fuelled the international 
movement in favour of those demands. 
The International Labour Organisation Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries 1957 ("ILO 
Convention 107")87 recognised the right of collective and individual land ownership. indigenou 
customary laws, and the right to compensation for land taken by governments. However, ILO 
Convention 107 was couched in assimilationist and integrationist rhet01ic typical of the 1940s 
and 1950s. 
The process for the revision of ILO Convention 107 began in 1986.88 Revision of ILO 
Convention 107 was sought by an increasing number of Non-Governmental indigenous 
organisations at the United Nations on the basis that advocacy of integration presupposed the 
application of national laws to indigenous peoples. 
The Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries39 ("ILO 
Convention 169") was adopted by members of the United Nations in 1989. ILO Convention 
169 treated the question of self-determination with great caution. Article 1 ILO Convention 169 
defined indigenous peoples as: 
a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community , and 
whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or 
by special laws or regulations. 
b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of 
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical 
region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the 
87 International Labour Organisation Convention I 07 ( I 957) 328 UNTS 247. 
88 A meeting of experts preceded the International Labour Organisation Governing Bodies' decision to adopt 
definitional recommendations put forward by an increasing number of indigenous non-Governmental 
Organisations at the United Nations. The revisions culminated in the adoption ofILO Convention 169. 
89 International Labour Organisation Convention 169 ( 1986). 
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establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, 
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. 
It is submitted that the reason for caution was that the principle of self-determination was 
historically synonymous with the realisation of independence from a colonial power. On that 
basis, article 1(3) of Il.,Q Convention 169 read: "The use of the term 'peoples' in this 
Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may 
attach to the term under international law". 90 That qualification meant that 'peoples' could not 
assert independence, being one of the consequences of the right to self-determination. More 
specifically, it was considered necessary that use of the term 'peoples' did not presuppose 
specific rights under international law, even though a 'peoples' exercising their right to self-
determination may choose from a range of possible outcomes other than independence. 
The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations has become the forum where 
indigenous peoples, governmental, non-governmental and interested organisation 91 can 
contribute constructively and systematically to the promotion, realisation and protection of the 
rights of the world's indigenous peoples.92 The Thirteenth 1996 Session of the Working Group 
on Indigenous Peoples saw the Chairperson-Rapporteur consider the concept of 'indigenous' 
incapable of precise, universally applicable definition. Nevertheless, the Working Group was 
prepared to take a broad approach, based on the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur 
commenting on the scope of International Labour Organisation Conventions 107 (1957) and 
169( 1989):93 
Indigenous communities. peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
social institutions and legal systems. 
9° Cassese argues the alternative, in accordance with the thesis that the right to self-determination applied to 
peoples under colonial oppression. See above n 2. 
9 1 For example, the Centre for World Indigenous Studies and Fourth World Documentation Project. 
92 At the Thirteenth Session of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples 1996 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/ AC.4/1996/2) the Chairperson-Rapporteur questioned the efficacy of a legalistic definition of 
the concept of indigenous peoples, pointing out that the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples had been a 
success despite not having adopted any formal definition 'indigenous peoples' . However, the Chairperson-
Rapporteur's view was outweighed by the desirability of a definitional guide for the benefit of indigenous 
peoples themselves, governments and the United Nations, in particular concerning the implementation of 
international legal instruments. 
93 UN Publication E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, para 379. See UN Publication E/CN .4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2, 
24. 
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Indigenous peoples resile against ethnocentric attempts at classification according to concepts 
such as religion, custom, ancestry and language. Instead, indigenous peoples emphasise their 
right of self-definition, both in terms of individual self-identification and with respect to the 
communities right to define its members. Some indigenous groups question the efficacy of an 
unequivocal definition.94 For example, indigenous peoples participating in the 1996 second and 
third sessions of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples95 stressed the need for definitional 
flexibility, and for respecting the desire and the right of each indigenous people to define itself. 
On that basis, the author submits the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples has adopted a 
flexible approach to determining eligibility to participate in its annual sessions. This is an 
indication of the evolutionary nature of the concept of self-determination and 'indigenous' in 
both practical and theoretical terms. 
International and domestic legal systems have tended to favour eurocentric objective criteria a 
measurements of the existence or non-existence of indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, the 
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples currently treats the concept of ' indigenous' as 
including:96 
a) Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory; 
b) The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include the 
aspects of language, social organisation, religion and spiritual values, modes of 
production, laws and institutions: 
c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by State authorities, 
as a distinct collectivity: and 
d) An experience of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or 
discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist . 
It is also recognised that such factors cannot constitute an inclusive or comprehensive definition. 
"Rather they represent factors which may be present, to a greater or lesser degree, in different 
regions and in different national and local contexts".97 
94 The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission in Australia adopts this view. It believes that the 
scope of certain definitions pertinent to the scope of the right to self-determination should be delineated by the 
worlds' indigenous peoples themselves . 
95 UN Publication E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 , 22. 
96 IA Daes/UN Publication Working Paper on the Con cept of Indigenous People 
(E/CN .4/Sub.2/ AC.4/ I 996/2, para 69). 
97 Above n 96, para 71. 
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Article 8 of the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1994 
reads: 
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and 
develop their distinct identities and characteristics , including the right to identify 
themselves as indigenous and to be recognised as such . 
VII. PARTICIPATION 
International law does not require or allow for any one pai1icular form of governmental strncture 
for all indigenous peoples. The author contends that the very fact of the diversity of indigenous 
peoples and their surrounding circumstances belies a singular formula. The underlying objective 
of self-determination is to allow indigenous peoples to achieve meaningful self-government 
through political institutions that reflect their specific cultural patterns. and that permit them to be 
genuinely associated with all decisions affecting them on a continuing basis. 
A. Active Participation 
Historically , the realm of international law and politics was circumscribed by unilateral, bi-
lateral and multi-lateral state actions. Those actions constituted the norms and standards by 
which the international rnle of law was defined and enforced. However, weaknesses in the 
state system have opened new channels for other political and legal interests to become active 
participants in international rule-making. Ryser98 argues that "Fourth World" nations99 
instinctively began to recognise the strengths and weaknesses of the state system. On that 
basis Fourth World nations began to see the importance of fommlating new international 
customs which entailed broad implications for the affairs of States, increased State 
recognition of indigenous affairs being the most notable. The Covenant on the Rights of 
Indigenous Nations is the integrated product of a unification of the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1977, the Indigenous 
Peoples Statement of Principles 1987 and the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples as revised by the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. 100 It 
represents the extensive efforts of Fourth World nations to formulate conceptions of rights 
98 RC Ryser ·'Evolving New International Laws From the Fourth World., ( I 994) Centre for World Indigenous 
Studies. 
99 Fourth World nations embody indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities and/or indigenous nations. 
100 UN Publication E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1993/CRP.4. 
29 
beyond those inherent to eurocentric paradigms. On that basis, Article 1 of the Covenant 
States: 101 
Nations signatory to this Covenant, exercising their inherent sovereign powers, 
declare their mutual respect, and aim to promote peaceful co-operation, preserve, 
protect and guarantee the rights and responsibilities of nations and the inherent 
rights of individuals, and to promote freedom, justice and international peace. 
B. Reformulations 
Given the far-reaching transformation of the social and political landscape we have witnessed 
this century, and especially these past several decades, there is a pressing need to rethink the 
concept and practice of sovereignty. 
"Currently some of the most concrete and problematic threats to sovereignty come from 
assertions of ethnonationalism and calls for self-determination".102 International law ha 
traditionally required non-State groups to appear as States prior to gaining recognition as an 
international legal personality. 103 Exclusion from participation in the international legal system 
was justified on the basis that entities embodying the characteristics of Statehood104 were 
representative· of particular populations or territories. In addition, "such claims of exclusion 
pose a challenge to the stability and integrity of the international legal community".' 05 
Indigenous objections are framed on the basis that eurocentric conceptions of representative 
entities (States) are incapable of representing the interests of groups entitled to exercise the 
right to self-determination.' 06 
VIII. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
A. Threat 
Some commentators assume the exercise of the right to self-determination to mean 
independence. 107 By implication, independence entails secession, violating the territorial 
10 1 Above n I 00. 
102 K Mills "Human Rights and Sovereignty" ( 1994) YorkCRS 12. 
103 Above n l l . 
104 Above n 12. 
105 Above n I, 1014. 
106 Above n 4. Anaya argues that such a situation may also be due to cultural or other differences. 
w7 Above n 2 . 
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integrity of the whole. 108 Resolution 2625 (XXV) 109 is the basis for a restrictive interpretation of 
the implications of the exercise of the right to self-determination. 
Relying on the phraseology of Resolution 1514 (XV) 110 Higgins, on the other hand, asserts that 
self-determination was never inextricably tied to independence. 111 "[Peoples] have always had 
the right to choose the form of their political and economic future. While independence has been 
the most frequently chosen path, other possibilities have always existed and have sometimes 
been chosen". 112 Self-determination is no longer limited to the possibility of independence or 
other post-colonial status. Higgins asserts: 113 
While self-determination began to be accepted as a legal right in the context of 
decolonisation, it was never restricted to a choice for independence. A choice by 
the peoples of a territory to join with another state. or to remain in a constitutional 
relationship with the former colonial power, was equally acceptable. Usually, of 
course, the choice has been for independence. 
"It is for the people to detennine the destiny of the territory and not the ten-itory the destiny of 
the people". 114 Resolution 1514(2) makes clear that the exercise of the right to self-
determination could result in a range of outcomes. Various outcomes consequent upon the 
exercise of the right to self-determination were contemplated by Article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 which States: 
l. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their Rolitical status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. ', 
108 P Thornberry "Self-Determination, Minorities. Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments" 
(1989) 37 ICLQ 867. 
109 Resolution 2625 (XXV) cautions against violations of territorial integrity to the extent that it shall not be 
construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign or independent States. 
11 0 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) posited the exercise of self-determination through independence, 
free association, integration with an independent state, or emergence into any other political status freely 
determined by the people. 
111 Above n 11 , 118. Compare Cassese above n 2, 186. 
112 Above n 11. 118. For example, many indigenous groups world-wide have chosen secession within the 
territory of a State. 
iu Above n 11, 113. This aspect is reflected in Article I of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966. Under that Article all peoples may freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
114 Western Sahara ICJ ( 1975) I 2, 122 per Dillard J. 
11 5 This text is repeated in Article 2 of the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples 1994. That Draft goes on to define in greater detail the rights of indigenous peoples . 
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Higgins argues that the right to self-determination is an ongoing one: 116 
The Human Rights Committee has consistently told States appearing before it for 
examination of their periodic reports that the right of self-determination requires 
that a free choice be afforded to the peoples, on a continuing basis, as to their 
system of government, in order that they can determine their political, economic, 
and cultural development. 
However, one of the fundamental difficulties with issues surrounding the evolution of the right 
to self determination stemmed from the apparent conflict between clauses 6 and 7 of Resolution 
1514. The conflict arises because the notion of self-determination embodies threats of disruption 
to the territorial integrity of States. Threats to territorial integrity, political or otherwise can give 
rise to armed conflict. The United Nations Charter 1945 sought to circumvent the resort to 
individual state force by providing mechanisms for asserting legal and political rights. In 
addition to the UN Charter's ambiguity its articles were f01mulated as mechanisms to deal with 
inter-State 117 hostilities. In that regard, Article 2(4) states: 
... ( 4) All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
However, Article 51 provides: 
51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self 
defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Therefore, a state need not gain the Security Council's permission to act in self defence. At the 
same time the Security Council can act to protect a member State's territorial integrity where it 
deems it necessary to do so. 
In an attempt at preventing the utilisation of the right to self-determinations threat to territorial 
integrity resolution 1514(6) States: 
(6) Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and 
the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
However, resolution 1514(7) effectively forces non-State entities seeking self-determination 
to choose between it and resolution 1514(6). 
11 6 Above n 11, 120. 
117 State against State. 
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Resolution 1514(7) States: 
(7) All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present 
Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all 
States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peopies and their territorial 
integrity. 
Resolution 1514(4) States: 
(4) All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent 
peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their 
right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be 
respected. 
Resolution 1514(5) States: 
(5) Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories o r 
all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers 
to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in 
accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to 
race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and 
freedom. 
IX. INDEPENDENCE? 
Resolution 1514(2) and Article 2 of the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples state: 
All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
Article 4 of the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People states: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct 
political, economic. social and cultural characteristics. as well as their legal systems, 
while retaining their rights to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, 
economic, social and cultural life of the State. 
Article 8 of the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People states: 
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and 
develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify 
themselves as indigenous and to be recognised as such. 
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The preamble to Resolution 2625 states: 
The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsi stent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
Indigenous peoples are estimated to number 300 million people in more than seventy countries. 
On that basis alone issues relevant to the furtherance of indigenous rights provide a major focus 
of concern for the international community. That concern stems from the majority of indigenous 
peoples having been dispossessed by colonial regimes. 11 8 
A. Contemporary Acknowledgement 
Indigenous peoples concerns were on the agenda at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development 1992. 1 19 The States present acknow !edged the need to 
recognise indigenous people's values, territories, traditional knowledge and rights. The 
author submits that such a situation constitutes recognition at international law of indigenous 
peoples as players in the international legal system. In addition, participating States admitted 
that indigenous peoples have special relationships with the earth, ecological knowledge and 
agricultural systems, and play vital roles in promoting sustainable development of natural 
resources. 
The United Nations began actively promoting partnerships between States and the indigenous 
peoples within the borders of those States in 1993. The United Nations' aim was to promote 
new partnerships, and encourage global efforts to address problems faced by indigenous 
peoples in areas such as human rights, environmental development, education and health. 
The Covenant on the Rights of Indigenous Nations 120 was initialled in Geneva, Switzerland 
on 28 July 1994. The Covenant purported to be the first comprehensive international law 
aimed at addressing the rights and iong-term social, economic and political interests of 
indigenous peoples. 
11 8 This concern is recognised in the Fifth Preambular paragraph of the revised United Nations Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1994 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
welcomed the recommendation of the Sub-Commission that the paragraphs of the Draft Declaration agreed 
upon at its second reading be revised to take into consideration comments of Governments. indigenous 
people's organisations and other interested parties. 
11 9 Commonly known as the Earth Summit. 
120 Above n I 00. 
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Article 1 of that Covenant states: 
Nations signatory to this Covenant, exercising their inherent sovereign powers, 
declare their mutual respect. These Covenants aim to promote peaceful co-
operation, and to preserve, protect and guarantee the rights and responsibilities o f 
nations and the inherent rights of individuals. and to promote freedom. justice and 
international peace. 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/163 was passed on 8 December 1994 
following a recommendation that the 1994 Year of Indigenous Peoples extend into a decade. 
Launching the Decade of Indigenous Peoples (1995-2004) the United Nations Secretary 
General emphasised the need for global co-operation: "I believe that the year [ 1994] will be 
the staiting point for two pa11nerships. One between indigenous peoples and States, the other 
between indigenous peoples and the United Nations". 121 The perpetuation of uch 
partnerships is to be based on equitable principles of mutuality, understanding, consultation 
and active participation by indigenous peoples in furtherance of indigenous self-determination 
X. IMPLEMENTATION 
Anaya asserts: 122 
The principle of self-determination and related human rights precepts undergird 
more particularised norms concerning indigenous peoples. Newly developing 
norms contain substantive and remedial prescriptions and, in conjunction with 
already established human rights standards of general applicability, form the 
benchmarks for ensuring indigenous peoples of ongoing self-determination. 
Anaya 123 and Higgins 124 argue that international law has evolved to incorporate entities other 
than States as players in the international legal regime. On that basis, and consequent upon 
the existence of the legal right to self-determination States have duties at international law in 
relation to indigenous peoples. The primary duty "is the duty of States to secure enjoyment of 
human rights and to provide remedies where the rights are violated". 125 Anaya asserts that 
121 United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/1608/HR, December 1994. 
122 Above n 4, 97. 
121 Above n 11 , 129. 
124 Above n 11 . 
125 Above n 4, 129. 
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such a duty is implicit, if not express, in international human rights treaties. 126 In addition, 
the duty is "similarly implicit in discernible customary human rights law". 127 The duty to 
secure enjoyment of human rights is heightened in the context of indigenous peoples and 
extends beyond States to the international community at arge. With increased intensity over 
the last several years, the international community has maintained indigenous peoples as 
special subjects of concern and sought co-operation to secure their rights and well-being. In 
particular, the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, and other international 
institutions have acknowledged the need for special programs for indigenous peoples at both 
the state and global levels. In his statement to the United Nations General Assembly at the 
inauguration of the International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples, Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasised that the commitment of the United Nations system to the 
cause of indigenous people is long-standing. Indigenous peoples are thus subjects of a 
special duty of care on the part of the international community. The duty exists as 
contemporary recognition of centuries of eurocentrically based systemic oppression. The duty 
does not necessitate assimilation or integration. The duty "requires the implementation of 
contemporary treaty and customary norms grounded in the principle of self-determination". 128 
XIII. CONCLUSION 
International law, the body of principles, norms and procedures that today function across 
national boundaries, remains State centred. However, international law is increasingly pulled at 
by a discourse directly concerned with individuals and even groups. Notions of State 
sovereignty remain alive in international law. Those notions are increasingly yielding to a 
n01mative trend defined by visions of world peace, stability and human rights. That trend, 
promoted by modern international institutions and involving non-State and State actors, 
enhances international law's competency over matters once considered within a State's 
exclusive domestic domain. 
The principle of self-determination and the development of related norms represents 
significant elements in indigenous people's centuries long quest for survival. International 
conventional and customary norms today provide legal grounds, however limited, for 
indigenous peoples to roll back the lingering scourge of colonial patterns and to exist as 
distinct communities in pursuit of their own destinies under conditions of equality. The 
126 Above n 4, 130. 
127 Above n 4, 129. 
128 Above n 4, 130. 
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United Nations Charter 1945 and other widely ratified international legal instruments 129 
affirm the principle of self-determination of peoples or include related human rights norms. 
Paiticularly relevant to indigenous peoples is International Labour Convention 169 of 1989, 
which has already been ratified in a number of countries and received favourable 
consideration in others. States, moreover, are subject to norms concerning indigenous 
peoples insofar as those norms are part of general or customary international law. Customary 
norms are binding upon the constituent units of the world community regardless of any 
formal act of assent to those norms. It is one thing, however, for international law to 
incorporate norms concerning indigenous peoples; it is quite another thing for the norms to 
take effect in the actual lives of people. 130 
129 For example see the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, International Labour 
Organ isation Convention 157(1957) and International Labour Organisation Convention 169( 1989). 
130 Above n 4, 128 . 
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